The Fifth Desk · Evaluation
Act I · The Map
Plato · a dialogue in direct speech between two men · Stephanus 227a to 279c · Athens, set outside the walls on the bank of the Ilissus; the date of composition uncertain · scored on Plato’s Greek, read from knowledge; no text in hand, Greek quoted only where its words are certain, with Nehamas and Woodruff’s translation for sense
Mode
Dialogue as contest and inquiry: three speeches on love, then a turn to ask what makes speech good, with the speeches as its specimens
Mythos
The four divine madnesses; the charioteer and the two winged horses; the procession of the gods and the place beyond heaven; the cicadas who sing to the Muses; Theuth and Thamus
Phase
One summer midday and the afternoon after it, from the walk out of the city to the prayer to Pan: Lysias’s speech, Socrates’ two speeches, the cicadas, the inquiry into speech, the judgment on writing
Presentation
Prose dialogue in direct speech, two speakers only, no narrator; Stephanus pages 227a to 279c, about 52 pages, 262 sections
Register
A pastiche of antithetical, list-like display prose; a speech near to dithyramb; the hymnic periods of the palinode; crisp question and answer; a plain prayer
Scale
Two men, one afternoon and one spot by a river, with the soul, the heavens, the cycle of lives and the city’s trade in speech in its argument
Governing Proposition
Socrates walks out of the city with Phaedrus, who carries a speech by Lysias under his cloak, and on the bank of the Ilissus, at noon, with the cicadas singing, three speeches on love are made: Lysias’s, cold and clever, for the man who does not love; Socrates’ own, spoken with his head covered and soon recanted; and Socrates’ recantation, in which love is a divine madness and the soul a charioteer with two winged horses, straining after the gods toward the place beyond heaven. Then the two men turn to ask what makes speech good, and take the speeches apart. The wager of the dialogue is that a single form can hold the madness and the method together, and that a written text can say truly why writing is not enough.
Act II · The Essay
Movement I
The dialogue has two speakers and no narrator: Socrates, and Phaedrus of Myrrhinus, a lover of speeches. Phaedrus has a speech by Lysias, the leading speechwriter of Athens, in a scroll under his cloak, and Socrates follows him out of the city to hear it. They walk barefoot along the Ilissus in the heat of a summer noon. The walk to the Ilissus takes about a fourteenth of the whole (227a to 230e), and the prologue is among the most reread passages of the dialogue.
On the way the talk turns to Boreas and Oreithyia (229b to 230a). Socrates declines to explain the myth away: he has not yet come to know himself. Then they reach the spot, and he describes it (230b to c): a tall plane tree, an agnus castus beside it, a spring sacred to the Nymphs and Achelous, cool water at the feet, the cicadas singing overhead. He describes it like a man who has never left the city; he learns from men in the city and not from trees. The detail is exact, and it will be needed.
Then Phaedrus reads Lysias’s speech aloud (230e to 234c). It praises the non-lover, the man who does not love, and it praises him in an antithetical, list-like display prose, clever, balanced and cold. Whether it is Lysias’s own or Plato’s pastiche is disputed; it is weighed here as Plato’s text either way. It takes about seven parts in a hundred of the dialogue. After an interlude (234c to 237a) Socrates is brought to answer it with a speech of his own.
Movement II
Socrates answers with a speech of his own, spoken with his head covered (237a to 241d). It is the speech the next one will recant, and he remarks on its manner as it goes: he is close to speaking in dithyrambs (238d). It takes about nine parts in a hundred, and it will be the left hand of the division the second half draws.
Then the divine sign he speaks of intervenes, and the recantation is set up (241d to 243e). The model he names is Stesichorus’s palinode for Helen (243a). So the dialogue’s central doctrine arrives as a retraction, and the reader hears it having first heard the speech it retracts, and Lysias’s before that.
The three speeches on love take about two fifths of the dialogue, and the part before the turn at 257b more than half. The palinode and the inquiry into speech that follows it are nearly equal in length, about a quarter of the whole each. That is the measured form of the oldest complaint about the work, that it has two subjects. The dialogue’s answer is that the first half is the second half’s matter, and it will make the answer by taking these speeches apart.
Movement III
The palinode (243e to 257b) begins with madness. The greatest goods come to us through madness when it is divine, and Socrates names four: the prophetic, the ritual, the poetic and the erotic (244a to 245c). Love is the fourth. Before the image of the soul comes a proof: “psuchē pasa athanatos”
“all soul is immortal” (245c). The proof is weighed here as part of the speech’s design, not as an argument to be accepted.
Then the image. The soul is like a charioteer with a pair of winged horses, one that obeys and one that bolts. The gods drive round the vault of heaven, Zeus first in his winged chariot, and the souls strain after them, trampling one another and losing their wings (246e to 248b). Beyond the vault lies the “huperouranion topon”
“place beyond heaven” (247c), which no poet here has hymned or will hymn worthily, Socrates says, and the speech makes the attempt. Then the cycle of lives, in nine ranks (248d to e).
The lover is the soul that sees beauty here and remembers. At the sight of the beloved the wing begins to grow again, an itching and swelling as of teething (251b to c), and Plato risks the absurd to set the sublime in the body. The struggle in the lover’s soul at the sight of the beloved (253c to 254e) is a psychology that still reads as true: desire, rightly met, is the means of the soul’s recovery and not only its danger. The palinode is a quarter of the dialogue, and its summit.
Movement IV
At 257b the register changes, and the two men turn to ask what makes speech good. Above them the cicadas are singing, and Socrates tells their story (259b to d): they were once men who, when the Muses were born, forgot to eat and drink for singing, and now they report to the Muses who honours them. Philosophy is named the gift of Calliope and Urania. The myth is the hinge of the work, and a warning against the drowsiness the dialogue has just escaped.
Lysias’s opening is taken apart (262d to 264e): it has no beginning, middle or end. A speech, Socrates says, must be composed like a living creature, with a body of its own, head and feet, middle and extremities fitting one another and the whole (264c). Then his own two speeches are reread as the two hands of a single division of madness, left and right (265a to 266b), and collection and division are set out as the method of dialectic. The whole, he hints, may have been a game (265c to d).
The inquiry into rhetoric is the longest part, a little over a quarter of the dialogue. It mocks the handbooks and their inventors, Theodorus, Evenus, Tisias, Gorgias, Polus, Thrasymachus (266d to 267d), at a length the argument does not need. It sketches a rhetoric that would match kinds of speech to kinds of soul (271c to 272b), promised more than shown. Its middle stretch is method more than drama, and the dialogue lets it be level ground.
Movement V
Socrates tells a story from Egypt, of Theuth and Thamus (274c to 275b), and it carries the judgment on writing: it is a drug for reminding, not for memory. Phaedrus remarks that Socrates easily makes up stories, Egyptian or from anywhere he likes (275b). Written words, Socrates goes on, cannot answer when they are questioned, and cannot choose their readers (275a to e).
The serious man, Socrates says, writes for amusement, sowing in gardens of letters (276b to d). The dialogue states this in writing. The case holds against the dialogue itself, and the dialogue knows it: it is a written text made as a living conversation, and it leaves its reader to do what writing cannot.
Socrates sends a message to Lysias, and one to Isocrates, whom he praises in terms that can be read two ways (278b to 279b). Then he prays to Pan (279b to c), asking that the outer and the inner man be one. The prayer is short and plain, and the last words follow it: “koina gar ta tōn philōn”
“friends have all things in common” (279c). The close takes about two parts in a hundred.
Act III · The Twelve
Subtract and see what goes, and most of what looks loose is required. Lysias’s speech must be given whole, because the second half takes it apart (262d to 264e) for having no beginning, middle or end, its parts as interchangeable as the lines of the epigram on Midas (264d). Socrates’ first speech must be given and must be wrong, because the palinode is its recantation, and the two are reread (265a to 266b) as the left and right hands of one division of madness. The cicadas, which read as ornament, are the drowsiness the conversation has to resist. What holds the axis down is about a tenth of the whole that could go: the catalogue of handbook terms and their inventors (266d to 267d), satire at a length the argument does not need; the programme of matching speech to soul (271a to 272b), stated more than once; and a stretch of assent that carries no weight.
Score: 8.4 / 10
The disclosure can be stated, and it holds without the frame it comes in. The soul’s life before birth and the cycle of lives in nine ranks (248d to e) need Plato’s metaphysics, and Socrates himself gives the soul only as what it is like (246a). Strip them, and three findings stand. Love is a madness, and madness is not simply a sickness: the four divine madnesses, prophetic, ritual, poetic and erotic, make a taxonomy of inspiration no one had set out before (244a to 245c). The soul is divided against itself, and desire rightly governed is the means of its recovery: the struggle in the lover (253c to 254e) still reads as true. Writing is a drug for reminding, not for memory; it cannot answer when questioned (275a to e). Held off the top because rhetoric as the leading of souls is sketched (271c to 272b), not shown.
Score: 9.0 / 10
Height and frequency both count, and the height here is gathered in one place. The procession of the gods round the vault of heaven, Zeus driving his winged chariot first and the souls straining after, trampling one another and losing their wings (246e to 248b), is among the heights of Greek prose; above it lies the “huperouranion topon”
“place beyond heaven” (247c), which no poet, Socrates says, has hymned worthily, elevation set as a challenge to poetry and met. The regrowth of the wing, an itching and swelling as in teething (251b to c), risks the absurd to set the sublime in the body. Lesser heights are real: the plane tree by the Ilissus, the cicadas, the short prayer to Pan. What holds it there is frequency. The palinode is about a quarter of the dialogue, and the long inquiry into rhetoric is level ground: the work rises once, greatly, and then reasons about rising.
Score: 8.9 / 10
Myth built, not only evoked, and the built myths bear weight. The charioteer with his two horses, one that obeys and one that bolts, is not an illustration attached to a theory of the soul; it is the theory, and the palinode, from the soul’s fall to the scene of the lovers, is told in its terms. It has become common property and stays particular: the dark horse crooked and heavy, reined back until it falls on its haunches. The cicadas, once men who forgot to eat and drink for singing (259b to d), govern the turn from love to speech; Theuth and Thamus (274c to 275b) carries the case against writing. What holds it there is that the chariot is an allegory with a key, and that much of the inherited myth is raised only to be set aside: Boreas and Oreithyia (229b to 230a), the Nymphs and Achelous, Stesichorus cited as a precedent.
Score: 9.2 / 10
The inherited forms were the Socratic conversation, the display speech of the orators and sophists, and the poets’ hymn, and the dialogue turns each against itself. It is the one dialogue set outside the city, by a Socrates who says he never leaves it. It reproduces a speech by the leading speechwriter of Athens, whether Lysias’s own or Plato’s pastiche is disputed, and beats it twice, once badly and once well, so that its central doctrine arrives as a retraction, on the model of Stesichorus’s palinode for Helen (243a). It argues against writing in the most written of forms, and that wager is its most consequential departure. Held below 9.0 because the turn is largely from Plato’s own practice: the dialogue form was his and well tried, and the Symposium had already crowned a sequence of speeches on love with a Socratic ascent.
Score: 8.9 / 10
Change the form and the dialogue can no longer say what it says. The speeches are performed and then judged, so the reader has felt the difference between Lysias’s speech and the palinode before being told what it is; the recantation is a form that knows a speaker can be wrong and turn. Its rule that a speech must be composed like a living creature, with head and feet, middle and extremities fitting one another and the whole (264c), is its description of itself. The case against writing has its force only from inside a written imitation of living speech, which ends by saying the serious man writes for amusement, sowing in gardens of letters (276d). What holds it there is the second half: Phaedrus thins to assent, the exchange could there be a treatise, and the two halves are joined by argument more than by form.
Score: 9.1 / 10
Evidence rather than promise, over two and a half millennia, and the open questions belong to this dialogue. Its unity has been argued since antiquity: the Neoplatonist Hermias wrote a commentary in the fifth century AD that survives, and Ferrari’s Listening to the Cicadas and Griswold’s Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus argue it still. Whether the case against writing is undone by being written is the question of Derrida’s “Plato’s Pharmacy” (1968), built on the word for drug at 275a; Nussbaum’s The Fragility of Goodness reads the palinode as a recantation and asks how far it goes; Anne Carson’s Eros the Bittersweet reads its love again. Each generation finds a different centre, love, soul, rhetoric, writing, the setting, and the echoes between the setting and the myths are left to be found. The yield is formal as well as semantic, though some of it is shared with the larger dialogues and the doctrine of Forms.
Score: 9.3 / 10
The field is Greek prose and philosophy of the fourth century BC, and the thought of Europe after it. The force is very high: it founds the theory of rhetoric as the leading of souls, sets out collection and division as the method of dialectic (265d to 266b), and is the first sustained argument about what writing does to the mind. Achieved reach is scored with it: Aristotle’s Rhetoric answers its demand for a rhetoric grounded in the hearer’s soul; Mann gives Aschenbach’s fevered thoughts in Death in Venice as Socrates instructing Phaedrus under the plane; the critique of writing is a founding text for media theory and deconstruction. What holds it there is that on love its reach is shared with the Symposium and often gives way to it, on rhetoric much of it runs through Aristotle, and its later fame lies where the size of the scholarship can stand in for reach.
Score: 9.0 / 10
Weighed on form, then presence. The text survives complete in the medieval Greek tradition of Plato’s works, the whole dialogue as transmitted, nothing lost or reassembled, with an ancient commentary, Hermias’, beside it. Presence was continuous in Greek, in late antique commentary and in Byzantium, and since the fifteenth century it has been read, translated and taught without a break, in philosophy and in the teaching of rhetoric and writing. Its surface is not fixed to its moment: Lysias and the handbook writers are history now, and the work is read for what it made of them. What holds it there is presence. In the Latin West it was largely unknown for close to a millennium, until Leonardo Bruni translated part of it and Ficino the whole, and its life now lies mainly in the academy, in philosophy, classics and rhetoric, more than in common reading.
Score: 9.3 / 10
Command shown in range and in control. Plato writes three speeches in three manners: a pastiche of Lysias’s plain, repetitive, list-like argument, close enough that its authorship is still argued; a first speech that keeps tipping toward dithyramb, as Socrates notices (238d); and the hymnic periods of the palinode. Around them runs conversational Attic of great ease, Socrates’ irony and Phaedrus’ eagerness distinct in a few lines, and a setting drawn with unusual exactness, the height of the plane tree, the cool water at the feet. The architecture is exact: a ring from the walk out of the city to the prayer before the walk back, the second half returning to judge each speech of the first. What holds it there is the second half, functional prose whose exchanges are often perfunctory, and the catalogue passages. The sound of the Attic is beyond this reckoning and is neither credited nor charged.
Score: 9.0 / 10
Take the two most distant elements: the place beyond heaven (247c) and the list of terms from the handbooks (266d to 267d). One law governs both: speech is judged by whether it leads a soul toward what is true, and love and rhetoric are both kinds of that leading, each needing madness governed by knowledge. Lysias’s speech, the palinode, the handbooks and the myths are put to the same test, and the prayer to Pan, asking for beauty within and only as much gold as a moderate man can carry, closes it. The law is stated (264c) and largely kept. Held below 9.0 because it is reached by argument after the fact more than felt throughout: the tone falls from rapture to analysis at 257b, and readers since antiquity have had to argue the unity. The hint that the whole was a game (265c to d) both answers and sharpens the charge.
Score: 8.7 / 10
Judged at the dialogue’s scale, it holds many orders in one structure: the soul and its divisions; erotic love and friendship; the gods, the Muses, the Nymphs, Pan, Delphi and the art of prophecy; the order of heaven and the cycle of lives; nature, in the river, the plane tree and the cicadas; the city, its assembly and law courts, Pericles and his schooling under Anaxagoras (269e to 270a); medicine, with Hippocrates as a model for the art of speech (270c); and the technology of writing. They are joined by the leading of souls, not listed: the palinode holds cosmos, soul and love in one image. What holds it there is what lies outside the walls: the family, labour, war and history, with women present only as the Nymphs and Oreithyia. Two men on a walk hold more than their length suggests; they do not hold a world.
Score: 8.5 / 10
Act IV · The Reckoning
8.9 / 10 · Final Average
Placement: Tier IV · Canonical
Strongest Dimensions
The Bottomless Well and The Imperishable at 9.3, then The Archetypal Deep at 9.2 and The Living Form at 9.1. Questions that belong to this dialogue and are still open, its unity and its written case against writing; a text whole and read over millennia; a myth of the soul that is the theory and not its illustration, the charioteer among the archetypal figures of the divided self; and a form that performs its claims, the speeches heard before they are judged.
Limiting Dimension
The Inevitable at 8.4, held by about a tenth of the whole that could go: the catalogue of handbook terms, the programme of speech and soul stated more than once, and a stretch of assent that carries no weight. Next, The Encompassed at 8.5, held by what two men on a walk do not hold, the family, labour, war and history, though the palinode joins cosmos, soul and love in one image; then The Inner Law at 8.7, held by the seam at 257b, where readers since antiquity have had to argue the unity rather than feel it.
The Necessity Cap clears at 8.4 against a threshold of 7.5. The Coherence Floor clears: The Living Form at 9.1, The Made at 9.0, The Inner Law at 8.7, each against 7.0. The Epochal Gate is met on all five: The Imperishable at 9.3, The Archetypal Deep at 9.2, The Unconcealment at 9.0, Pressure on Tradition at 9.0 and The Swerve at 8.9 clear the bar of 8.5, The Swerve by four tenths. The Universal Minimum is met (no counted axis falls below The Inevitable at 8.4, against 7.5), and The Encompassed, which is exempted, clears its own floor of 6.0 at 8.5. Every summit condition is met; the work is held below the summit by its aggregate alone.
Basis · a reading from knowledge of Plato’s Phaedrus (Phaidros), scored as the dialogue transmitted in Greek: one work, complete, Stephanus pages 227a to 279c, with no part held spurious. It stands in the third tetralogy of Thrasyllus’s arrangement of the dialogues, with the Parmenides, Philebus and Symposium. The date of composition is uncertain. The text survives in the medieval Greek tradition of Plato’s works, with the commentary of the Neoplatonist Hermias; in the Latin West it was largely unread until the fifteenth century, when Leonardo Bruni translated part of it and Ficino the whole. It is weighed here as written work, its thought through its form, as philosophy in literary form. No text was in hand, and no quotation was checked against a file. Every axis is judged on Plato’s Greek. Greek is quoted only where its words are certain, in transliteration, with a close English rendering beneath; references are to Stephanus pages and sections. The proportions given are measured in Stephanus sections, five to a page, 262 in all, to within about one section. Translations · Nehamas and Woodruff (Hackett, 1995), for sense; Hackforth’s (1952) and Rowe’s (Aris and Phillips) commentaries. None is quoted, and no translation’s shortfall is charged to the dialogue. The sound and rhythm of the Attic prose are beyond this reckoning and are neither credited nor charged. Matters that could not be verified, among them the date of composition, the exact bounds of the sections, the age of the oldest manuscripts, the papyrus witnesses, the dates of the Latin translations, Iamblichus’ view of the subject and a hexameter cadence at the close of Socrates’ first speech, are not given.